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ABSTRACT 
REWARD DISTRACTERS AND WORKING MEMORY PERFORMANCE 
 
by 
 
Tara A. Miskovich 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Associate Professor Christine L. Larson, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Past literature has demonstrated that reward stimuli capture attention involuntarily, much 
like salient stimuli or other emotional stimuli (e.g., threat). In addition, even previously 
rewarded stimuli capture attention when they are not task-relevant. Recent evidence has 
demonstrated that affective stimuli have preferential access to working memory stores, 
even when they are task-irrelevant distracters. The current study aimed to assess the 
potential impact of attentional capture of task-irrelevant reward stimuli on filtering 
efficiency into working memory. It was predicted that this attentional capture of stimuli 
representing reward may impact ongoing goal-directed behavior by impairing the 
encoding of task-relevant information into working memory and potentially enhancing 
distracter processing. The results did not support this hypothesis that there would be a 
differential impairment with the presence of a reward distracter.  
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We are bombarded with a tremendous amount of rich environmental stimuli at 
any given moment. To cope with this, we have evolved shortcuts to facilitate adaptive 
allocation of cognitive resources. Specifically, two mechanisms of attention selection 
help us determine how we should allocate our limited attentional resources (Anderson, 
2013; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Top-down processes help us focus attention on goal-
related stimuli, while bottom-up processes help us assess salience of incoming stimuli 
and draw attention toward such stimuli if warranted (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Theeuwes, 2010). These two mechanisms work together in order to encourage broader 
goal-directed behavior while keeping the organism attuned to salient information in the 
environment that may warrant shifting of attentional resources (Anderson, 2013; Corbetta 
& Schulman, 2002).  
It is well documented that stimuli that are physically salient (e.g. the color red) 
(Fortier-Gautherier, Dell’Acqui, & Jolicoeur, 2013), engage the bottom-up mechanism 
and capture attention involuntary (Theeuwes, 1992). In addition to physical salience, 
evidence has indicated that we divert attentional resources to certain emotional stimuli 
(Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009), such as threat (Bannerman, Milders, & Sahraie, 2010; 
Bishop, 2008), regardless of its relevance to current task goals (Bishop, 2007). However, 
much less is known about the impact of rewarding stimuli on these processes. Prior 
evidence has demonstrated an attentional bias for certain pleasant stimuli such as positive 
faces that may be rewarding (Hodsoll, Vinding, & Lavie, 2011), but it is hard to 
determine if a learned association drives the associated attentional-bias or if these stimuli 
are inherently salient (Anderson Laurent, & Yantis, 2011, Anderson, 2013). To tease 
apart the effect of learned associations, recent literature has focused on experimentally 
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manipulating stimuli-reward associations to assess the impact on attentional selection. 
For instance, some studies have demonstrated that efficiency in visual search increases 
when target items are associated with reward (Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009; Kristjánsson, 
Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010), indicating a potential attentional bias toward reward 
stimuli. In addition, Della Libera and Chelazzi (2006) and Hickey, Chelazzi, and 
Theeuwes (2010) demonstrated that when certain stimulus features are associated with 
the receipt of a high reward over a low reward on one trial, these features are more 
quickly recognized in a target in the next trial. Alternatively, when stimulus features for a 
target that received a high reward on the prior trial now represents a distracter, responses 
are slower than if their prior response received a low reward. This effect has been termed 
“reward priming” and refers to how receipt of a reward effects the allocation of attention 
on the following trial (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey, et al., 2010).  
The evidence demonstrating that reward increases visual search efficiency and 
modulates priming of attention for future trials has led some to argue that stimuli that are 
not inherently salient or affective, but have been previously rewarded, are also 
preferentially attended to (Anderson et al., 2011; Anderson, 2013; Della Libera, Perlato, 
& Chelazzi, 2009). It has been argued that reward may influence attention in a way that 
cannot be explained entirely by the previously discussed two mechanisms of attentional 
selection (Anderson, 2013; Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). Anderson (2013) 
proposed the addition of another mechanism of selective attention identified as the value-
driven mechanism of attention, in which previously rewarded stimuli are readily 
identified in the environment. Much like with bottom-up attentional selection, current 
goal-related attention may be disrupted in favor of attending to stimuli that are not 
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inherently salient, but have been associated with reward in the past (Anderson et al., 
2011; Anderson, 2013; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012).  
Although evidence from visual search and reward priming paradigms lend 
evidence to the existence of a value-driven mechanism of attention, driven by the 
properties of the stimuli, one could argue that these effects merely demonstrates how 
reward modulates the deployment of the top down goal-directed mechanism (Anderson, 
2013).  Indeed many studies have demonstrated that reward can be a powerful motivator 
to increase performance in goal-related tasks (Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). However, 
several recent studies have shown that previously rewarded stimuli seem to capture 
attention, even when they are no longer relevant to current goals (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). For instance, in a 
Stroop task participants improved performance when a color was rewarded with correct 
identification (naming the ink) but performance was impaired when they had to inhibit 
reading the name of the rewarded color (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010), indicating 
that irrelevant reward information can impair task-relevant performance. Anderson and 
colleagues (2011) conducted a series of experiments that provided further evidence of the 
distracting effect of previously rewarded stimuli. They found that previously rewarded 
information captures attention when it is no longer relevant to current task goals. When a 
previously rewarded stimulus was used as a distracter in a non-rewarded attention task, 
reaction times were slowed, indicating a processing cost of having a reward distracter 
present (Anderson et al., 2011).   
One could argue that this cost is not necessarily due to attentional capture of the 
distracter, but could reflect other processes such as arousal (Anderson, 2013; Qi, Zeng, 
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Ding, & Li, 2013; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). Recent evidence has dispelled this 
notion with evidence from eye-tracking that demonstrated initial ocular movements 
towards highly valued stimuli prior to relevant target items (Anderson & Yantis, 2012; 
Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). In addition, Qi et al. (2013) recorded event-related 
potentials during an adaptation of the Anderson et al. (2011) task and demonstrated that 
previously rewarded stimuli captured attention by eliciting an N2pc, an ERP component 
that reflects early attention, prior to the target. Anderson (2013) argues that collectively 
this evidence demonstrates the existence of another adaptive system, arguably similar to 
the bottom-up mechanism that works by disrupting current goal-driven behavior to attend 
to important stimuli in the environment. Unlike the bottom-up mechanism of attention, 
the value-driven mechanism requires a learned component from the organism to 
recognize these rewarding opportunities in the environment. 
 Although the attentional bias toward previously rewarded information has been 
well established in the literature, little is known about the downstream behavioral 
consequences of this bias. Working memory, which has been called the “blackboard of 
the mind” (Goldman-Rakic, 1996, p. 13473), allows us to hold and manipulate 
information in an effort to direct goal-related behavior (Baddeley, 2012; Cowan, 2005). 
Attentional control is thought to act as the “gatekeeper” of information that goes on to be 
maintained in working memory (Awh, Vogel & Oh, 2006). Given our limited capacity to 
hold information in working memory (Luck, & Vogel, 1997), we must rely on these 
aforementioned mechanisms of selective attention in order to capture the most important 
information in the environment and filter out irrelevant information from entering 
working memory stores (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Vogel, McCollough, & 
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Machizawa, 2005). These processes are especially important when we are engaging in 
cognitive control, which requires working memory resources in order to maintain 
attention on goal-related tasks (Miller, 2000). 
 Although evidence has shown that affective stimuli (both threat and reward) 
capture attention (e.g. Anderson et al., 2011; Bishop 2008), little is known about how 
emotionally salient yet distracting information may also impact filtering information into 
(or out of) working memory, which may impact ongoing behaviors (Stout, Shackman, & 
Larson, 2013). Prior neuroimaging research has demonstrated the distracting effect of 
emotional stimuli during working memory maintenance, showing that neural regions 
associated with holding task relevant information in working memory are less active 
when presented with an emotional distracter, while regions important for emotional 
processing demonstrate increased activity (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). This indicates 
that cognitive control regions involved in active maintenance of relevant information go 
offline in favor of processing non-relevant emotional stimuli. Stout et al. (2013) then 
demonstrated that irrelevant fearful information has privileged access to working memory 
stores over relevant neutral information by looking at the impact of distracters in the 
encoding phase of a working memory task. They demonstrated through an ERP 
component that is thought to reflect working memory storage (the contralateral delay 
activity) that fearful face distracters are more likely to be encoded and stored in working 
memory over neutral face distracters, indicating that fear is hard to ignore. No study to 
our knowledge, however, has examined the impact of distracting reward stimuli on 
filtering efficiency into working memory.  
 
  
 
6 
Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to examine the impact of rewarded distracters 
on filtering efficiency into working memory by measuring behavioral indicators of 
working memory capacity for target items and filtering efficiency. As stated, research has 
demonstrated the attentional bias of previously rewarded stimuli, as evident by longer 
processing time and attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; 
Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012), but no one has examined the extent to which irrelevant 
reward distracters impair encoding and maintaining goal-relevant information.  Much like 
neurocognitive models of anxiety and threat (Bishop, 2007) there may be behavioral 
consequences of reward distraction such as unnecessary storage of irrelevant rewarding 
distracters in further downstream processing. For instance, excess distraction could lead 
to storage in long-term memory that could result in intrusive thoughts and further 
disruption of goal-related behavior. It was predicted that efficient filtering of goal-
relevant items into working memory would be impaired when a distracter that was 
previously associated with a reward is present, due attentional capture of the reward 
stimuli. To examine this, we measured K, a behavioral measure for working memory 
capacity for targets that accounts for hits and false alarms, as well a filtering cost, which 
is a behavioral measure of inefficiency in filtering out distracters from entering working 
memory (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009). It was predicted that K scores would be lower when a 
reward distracter is present in an array of distracters and targets than when all distracters 
are emotionally neutral, demonstrating impaired target encoding. In addition, filtering 
cost scores, indicating poorer filtering efficiency of distracters, were predicted to be 
higher when a reward distracter is present.  This might indicate that this value-driven 
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mechanism of attentional selection (Anderson, 2013) results in privileged access to 
working memory.  
In more exploratory analyses we examined how individual differences in 
sensitivity to reward, impulsivity, and working memory capacity may modulate the 
effects of the distracting effect of irrelevant reward on working memory. We predicted 
that higher reward sensitivity and impulsivity would be related to greater impaired target 
processing and poorer filtering into working memory when a reward distracter is present.  
This study builds on prior research to help us better understand the extent to 
which previously-rewarded distracters not only capture attention but may disrupt ongoing 
goal driven behavior by impacting what information is encoded into working memory. 
Understanding the downstream consequences of value-driven attention may yield a 
neurocognitive model to better understand the etiology of a number of forms of 
psychopathology characteristic of reward dysfunction (e.g. addiction, obesity) (Anderson 
et al., 2011).  By delineating a mechanism via which attention is drawn involuntarily to 
learned reward, we may be able to better understand how this mechanism can 
maladaptively disrupt ongoing goal-directed behavior in these disorders. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-nine participants (39 female) were recruited from the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee student population in exchange for extra-credit for courses (M = 
22.96, SD = 6.04). Participants had to be at least 18 years old, proficient in English, and 
have no visual impairment. Subjects were provided written informed consent prior to 
participation and the study was approved by the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee’s 
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Institutional Review Board. Two participants’ data were dropped due to non-compliance 
with experimental procedures. One participant was excluded due to the possibility of 
color blindness. One participant was missing data from the test phase. Nine participants 
were excluded due to performance (see data cleaning below). 
Primary Task  
 Participants completed a behavioral study in which working memory capacity and 
filtering efficiency was assessed using both emotionally neutral- and reward-related 
distracters. We used an adaptation of the attention task used by Anderson and colleagues 
(2011). We modified this task to resemble prior working memory and filtering tasks 
(Fukuda & Vogel, 2009; Vogel et al., 2005) in order to assess how previously rewarding 
but irrelevant stimuli impact working memory performance.  Participants completed two 
working memory change detection tasks that involve a visual search, training phase 
followed by a test phase.  First participants were run on the training phase, which 
consisted of 240 trials, in which participants were instructed that they had the opportunity 
to win money based on their performance, but were not told the specific contingencies. 
Participants were instructed to pay attention to an array of six different colored circles 
(each 2.3° x 2.3° visual angle) with bars of varying orientation inside of each. Each circle 
was placed equally around the fixation point along an imaginary circle (3.3° radius with a 
0.5° x 0.5° fixation cross at the center). Each trial began with a 2000ms screen with “get 
ready” centered on the screen. For each trial, they were instructed to pay attention to the 
orientation of a bar inside either the red or the green target (only one target per trial) 
displayed in the brief array of the six circles (300ms), and to remember them over a short 
delay (900ms). After the delay the array was displayed again (the probe) and they were 
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instructed to identify either a change (of 45 degrees) or no change of the bar orientation 
inside target items. On 80% of the trials, correct identification of only one of the colored 
targets (red or green) yielded a 10-cent reward, which participants were notified via a 
feedback screen indicating a correct response and the reward won. Correct responses for 
the other colored target did not yield a reward. The purpose of training these 
contingencies was to imbue one colored circle with affective salience (reward), while the 
other colored circle will remain affectively neutral.   
 Next, in the test phase, participants were told they would perform another task in 
which they would not receive any monetary rewards. In this phase, participants 
completed a similar working memory task (same timings) as the training phase, but were 
now instructed to pay attention to the item shape and to remember the orientation of bars 
inside any diamonds and to ignore all circles (shapes are counterbalanced). After the 
delay, they were asked to make a judgment if any of the bars enclosed in target items 
(diamonds) had changed in orientation. Targets from the training phase were included as 
items that participants have to ignore. The important conditions in the test phase were: 1.) 
two affectively neutral targets (diamonds in colors other than red or green) alone (NT2), 
2.) two neutral targets with four neutral distracters, including the previously non-
rewarded target in the training phase (ND), 3.) two neutral targets with three neutral 
distracters and one distracter that was the previously rewarded target from the training 
phase (RD) and 4.) two neutral targets with four neutral distracters that did not include 
either of the target colors from the training phase (NDnew). By including a distracter that 
was previously associated with a reward (RD), we were able to assess the impact of goal-
irrelevant reward distraction on working memory storage of target or goal-relevant 
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information into working memory. Each condition had 34 trials and the order was 
randomized. 
a.)                                                                                                      
                      
b.) 
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Figure1. a.) Example of the training phase, in which participants learn that one of the two colored targets, 
is associated with a reward with correct identification, whereas the other target does not yield a reward or 
feedback with correct identification. b.) Example of the test phase, in which participants are instructed to 
ignore circles and pay attention to the orientation of the bars inside of the diamonds. The two targets from 
the training phase, both rewarded and non-rewarded, now serve as distracters to be ignored. 
Self-report Measures 
 We collected measures of sensitivity to reward by administering the Sensitivity to 
Reward and Punishment scale (Torrubia, Avila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001), which has two 
scales for sensitivity for reward and punishment. Both the SR and SP scales have 
demonstrated good internal consistency and reliability at 3 months (alpha = .83 and .78, 
r= .89 and .87, respectively). We also collected the self-report Behavioral Activation 
Scale developed by Carver and White (1994) to assess individual differences in the 
behavioral activation and behavioral inhibition systems. This measure has demonstrated 
good psychometric properties related to test-retest reliability, internal consistency, and 
convergent and discriminant validity (Carver & White, 1994). In addition, we assessed 
impulsivity with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 
1995). This measure has demonstrated internal consistency with alpha ranging from .79-
.83 in various populations (Patton et al., 1995).  
Working Memory Capacity 
To understand how individual differences in working memory capacity may 
influence one’s ability to filter out reward distracters we measured basic visual working 
memory capacity using a basic change detection task modeled after Luck and Vogel 
(1997). The task consisted of three different conditions, 2 targets, 4 targets, or 6 targets 
over 120 trials. The task required participants to remember an array of colored squares 
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shown very briefly (100ms). After a brief delay (900ms) participants were shown only 
one of the squares from the previous array and were asked to determine if the probe 
square has changed in color (Luck &Vogel, 1997). 
Data Cleaning 
 Data analysis focused on data collected in the test phase. Subjects performing at 
or below 50% in any of the key conditions were dropped from further analyses (n = 7). 
All trials where response to the probe exceeded 5000 ms were also dropped. From here 
any trials that were greater than or less than three standard deviations away from the 
mean reaction time were considered outlier responses and removed from further data 
analyses (Anderson et al., 2011). The average amount of trials dropped total per subject 
was 4.9 (3.6%): NT2 (M = .88), RD (M = 1.09), ND (M=1.51), NDnew (M = 1.52). 
There was a significant difference in amount of trials dropped per conditions [F(3, 198) = 
6.954, p <.001]. Post hoc tests revealed that there were significantly more NDnew and 
ND trials dropped compared to NT (p = .001 and p =.005 respectively). Subjects were 
excluded if 20% or more of all trials were dropped (n = 2).  
Task Dependent Variables 
  To assess the extent to which individuals had trouble preventing task-irrelevant 
rewarding stimuli from entering working memory, we used two primary dependent 
variables, Pashler’s K and filtering cost scores. Pashler’s K formula K = S × (H – FA)/(1-
FA) is a behavioral measure of working memory capacity for targets that considers both 
hits and false alarms (Pashler, 1988). We calculated this for the four key conditions in the 
test phase: 1) two targets and four distracters, one of which was the previously associated 
reward stimuli (RD); 2) two targets and four distracters, one of which is the previously 
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learned neutral target (ND); 3) two targets and four distracters that do not include the 
colors of the two targets from the training phase (NDnew); and two targets and no 
distracters (NT2). The inclusion of the two target condition allows us to compare the 
effect of having distracters present. 
In addition, I will examine filtering cost scores across conditions. The filtering 
cost score is an indicator of the efficiency of filtering distracters from entering working 
memory and takes the difference in average target accuracy between trials with only two 
neutral targets (NT2) and trials with additional distracters (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009). 
Therefore, a filtering cost score of “0” would indicate perfect filtering, while anything 
above that indicates impaired filtering of distracters from working memory. We 
calculated the filtering cost score for the three distracter conditions: RD, ND, and 
NDnew. 
It is important to note that we did not include an analyses of reaction time in this 
study. The decision not to include an analysis of RT was due to the fact that accuracy 
during the working memory task was emphasized while speed was not. 
Results 
Effect of Distracters on Working Memory Capacity 
 To test the impact of a rewarding distracter on working memory capacity for 
target items a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare working memory 
for targets (Cowan’s K) in each of the four conditions (NT, RD, ND, NDnew). There was 
a significant effect of Condition [F(3,165) = 45.037, p <.001]. Bonferroni corrected 
pairwise comparison demonstrated that NT was significantly different from the other 
three conditions (p<.001). There were no significant differences in K scores between the 
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three distracter conditions (p = 1). This indicates that working memory for targets is 
greater when there are no distracters present, but when distracters are present there was 
no difference across conditions. 
 
Figure2. Average working memory capacity for targets (K) by condition. K was significantly higher in the 
condition with two neutral targets alone compared to conditions with distracters present (p<.001). 
Effect of Distracters on Filtering Efficiency 
 To test the impact of a reward distracter on filtering efficiency a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to compare filtering cost scores for the three distracter 
conditions (RD, ND, NDnew). There was no significant effect of condition [F(2, 110) = 
.145, p = .865]. This indicates that filtering efficiency is similar across all distracter 
conditions, and there was no effect of distracter valence. 
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Figure3. Average filtering cost by condition. There were no significant differences across condition in 
filtering inefficiency into working memory. 
Filtering Cost over Time 
 In an exploratory analysis we tested for the possibility that responses to the 
previously rewarded distracter may have extinguished over time in the test phase. We 
divided trials into three different time bins across the task (Early = trials 1-102, Middle = 
103-204, Late = 205-306) and calculated filtering cost scores for RD, ND, and NDnew 
for each bin. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with both Time and Condition 
as within subject factors. There was no significant main effect of Condition [F(2,110) = 
.160, p = .853], or Time [F(2, 110) = 2.226,  p = .113. This indicates there are no 
significant differences in filtering efficiency across condition or over the course of the 
task. Finally there was no significant interaction between Condition and Time [F(4,220) 
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= .230, p = .921. 
 
Figure4. Average filtering cost scores by time bin for each condition. There were no significant main 
effects of time or condition, or a significant interaction of time by condition. 
Individual Differences in the Presence of Reward Distracters 
 Table 1 shows Pearson correlations for each measure of individual differences 
(BIS11, BAS, Sensitivity to Reward, and working memory capacity). There was a 
significant negative correlation between filtering cost scores in the RD condition and 
sensitivity to reward as measured by the SR scale in the SRSPQ. This correlation 
indicated that those who scored higher on the Sensitivity to Reward scale were more 
efficient at filtering out reward distracters (condition RD). There were no significant 
correlations between RD filtering cost scores and scores on the BIS11 impulsivity scale 
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or BAS.  There were also no significant correlations between K scores on the BIS11, 
BAS, or SR scale in any of the distracter conditions (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table1. Individual Differences. Pearson correlations for BIS11, BAS, Sensitivity to Reward, and working 
memory capacity. Sensitivity to Reward was negatively correlated with filtering cost for RD. Working 
memory capacity was positively correlated with K for RD. 
To examine whether greater working memory capacity was associated with better 
filtering of reward distracters, we took a difference score between ND and RD (ND-RD) 
and correlated that value with individual working memory capacity as measured by 
Pashler’s K. We found no significant relationships between these differences scores in K 
or filtering cost and working memory capacity. We then correlated K scores for each 
condition with working memory capacity and found a significant positive correlation 
between K scores in RD and working memory capacity. There was no significant 
relationship between K scores in ND or NDnew and working memory capacity (see table 
1). This may indicate that an individual’s working memory capacity is important for 
remembering targets particularly in the presence of a reward distracter. 
 
Measure N K Scores Filtering Cost Scores 
  RD ND NDnew ND-RD RD ND NDnew ND-RD 
BIS 11 39 .019    .197    
BAS Total 52 .092    -.200    
Sensitivity to 
Reward 
56 .177    -.307* .251 -.211  
WM Capacity 55 .309* .217 .177 -.058    -.027 
*p <.05          
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to test whether the presence of a task-irrelevant 
distracter stimulus that was previously associated with reward would impair working 
memory performance in two ways. First, we predicted that filtering of relevant 
information into working memory would be impaired. Second, we predicted that working 
memory capacity for target items would be lower. The results of the current study did not 
support the predictions. Although the presence of distracters impaired working memory 
performance, we did not find any support to show that previously rewarded distracters 
affected performance more than neutral distracters.   
 The findings of the current study are not consistent with what would be predicted 
based on the hypothesis that reward captures attention in an involuntary bottom-up 
fashion (Anderson et al., 2011; Hickey & van Zoest, 2012), which was the primary 
hypothesis behind this work at the time I proposed it. However, since the proposal of the 
current study Gong and Li (2014) published a study examining the influence of irrelevant 
reward on working memory using a similar approach, and their findings are consistent 
with what we found. In a similar task, they found improved working memory 
performance when a probe item was presented in the previously rewarded color. 
However, they found no impairment in working memory performance of a probed 
stimulus when a previously reward stimuli was also presented in the memory array, 
inconsistent with the attentional capture hypothesis.  
In light of these findings Gong and Li (2014) posited that there may be multiple 
ways in which reward influences attention. While, it has been demonstrated that one 
influence is through attentional capture of reward stimuli (Anderson et al., 2011; 
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Anderson & Yantis, 2012), another influence may be through enhanced early perceptual 
processing. Although several studies have argued that the distracting effect of reward is 
primarily due to attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; 
Hickey et al., 2010; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012), Gong and Li (2014) did not find 
evidence to support this hypothesis. In their experiment three, participants completed a 
training phase and then a working memory test phase like the current study. However, in 
the test phase they presented all items (rather than just distracters) in either the high 
reward, low reward, or control color. They still found there was greater working memory 
improvement in a change detection task in which all stimuli, targets and distracters, were 
presented in the high reward color over the low reward and a control color. Since 
distracters and the target were all presented in the same color, attentional capture alone 
could not explain the improved influence on working memory performance. Therefore, 
the findings of the current study may also lend evidence to suggest that the influence of 
reward stimuli on visual attention may not be entirely due to attentional capture but may 
be modulatory through feature-based attention (Gong & Li, 2014).  
 In addition, the current study was in part based on work investigating the 
influence of threat distracters; however, reward and threat may have different attentional 
effects. Gong and Li (2014) argue that reward may influence attention by enhancing the 
representation of task-relevant stimuli in working memory, but in contrast to what has 
been found with task-irrelevant threat (Bishop, 2007; Stout et al., 2013), task irrelevant 
reward does not necessarily impair task-relevant representations. The potential 
differential effects of reward and threat on selective attention may reflect the different 
neural circuitry instantiating detection of threat and reward. Detection of threat is 
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dependent on amygdala-prefrontal circuitry (Bishop, 2007; Shechner et al., 2012), while 
detection of reward typically involves frontostriatal circuits (Frank & Fossella, 2010; 
Shechner et al., 2012). In addition, this system may interact with regions implicated in 
attentonal control to boost these processes (Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 
2009), interestingly, activation of the basal ganglia-PFC circuitry has also been 
associated with better filtering of distracters (McNab & Klinberg, 2008). It is possible 
that even though this circuit responds to reward, the activation of frontostriatal circuitry 
also boosts attentional filtering into working memory. This may be an important factor in 
understanding why irrelevant threat may have privileged access to working memory 
stores while reward does not.  
 We also examined the influence of individual differences in reward sensitivity, 
impulsivity, and working memory capacity on filtering of reward distracters into working 
memory. In contrast with our hypothesis, we found that those higher in sensitivity to 
reward actually were better able to filter our reward distracters than those low in 
sensitivity to reward. Although we predicted that those sensitive to reward may be more 
susceptible to attentional biases to previously rewarded stimuli (even in a non-rewarded 
task), it may be possible that the presence of a reward cue, although task-irrelevant, may 
have increased cognitive control in those high in sensitivity to reward. This is consistent 
with previous working memory studies that have demonstrated those high in trait 
sensitivity to reward were better able to optimize their performance in a rewarded task 
(Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010). This is hypothesized to be due to a shift in proactive 
cognitive control evident by greater PFC activation in reward contexts (Braver, 2012). In 
this case, these individuals were better able to filter out reward distracters and attend to 
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the current task. We also found some evidence to suggest that an individual’s working 
memory capacity is important in remembering targets in the face of distracters. High 
working memory capacity was associated with better working memory capacity for target 
items in the face of distracters, but only when a reward distracter was present. Previous 
research has suggested that those low in working memory capacity are more susceptible 
to attentional capture to bottom-up salient stimulus features (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009) as 
well as to previously rewarded distracters (Anderson et al., 2011). Perhaps, those high on 
WM capacity are better able to inhibit the influence of salient reward distracters.  It is 
important to point out that we did not correct for family-wise error in our analyses of 
individual differences, but these results indicate the need for feature investigation to 
replicate these important individual differences in reward processing. 
Although, there may be evidence to suggest that attentional capture of task-
irrelevant reward does not lead to impairment in working memory performance (Gong & 
Li, 2014), more research is necessary to support this conclusion. Even though we did not 
currently find a distracting effect of irrelevant reward, there are several reasons why the 
current study may not have been optimal to detect the effect of a reward distracter on 
working memory. The amount of cognitive demand placed on participants in the current 
task was higher than that of Anderson et al. (2011) since participants also had to encode 
and maintain two items in working memory, rather than detecting a singleton in an array. 
Gong and Li (2014) had a load of 8 items over the delay, which is much higher than the 
current study. Prior research has demonstrated that increasing working memory load 
increases the impact of distracters in a separate task (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie., 
2001; Lavie, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie & de Frockert, 2005). It is possible that 
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the load on working memory increased the impact of distracters to a point that there was 
no longer an effect of the valence of the distracter. If cognitive load in fact decreases the 
impact of attentional bias of a particular valence that could explain why Gong and Li 
(2014) and the current study did not find evidence of attentional capture. Finally, we also 
did not assess how well the contingencies between the stimulus and reward were learned 
in the training phase. It may be important to assess both explicitly and implicitly whether 
participants made the necessary reward associations. Indeed there is evidence to suggest 
that conscious and unconscious processing of reward cues differentially impacts 
maintenance of goal-relevant information in working memory (Zedelius, Veling, & 
Aarts, 2011). 
Future Directions 
 The exact mechanism involved in reward’s influence on visual selective attention 
is still not well understood. Although several studies have demonstrated the impact of 
reward on attention, the attentional capture hypothesis may not be able to entirely explain 
the influence reward associated features have on attention. The current study and 
previous studies (Gong & Li, 2014) have failed to demonstrated the same impairment in 
working memory performance with reward distracters present that has been found in 
threat distracters (Sessa, Luria, Gotler, Jolicoeur, & Dell’Acqua, 2011; Stout et a., 2013). 
Therefore, unlike threat, it is possible that irrelevant reward does not generally interfere 
with working memory processes. Neuroimaging studies would be useful in clarifying the 
common and distinct mechanisms underlying visual selection and working memory in the 
face of task-irrelevant threat and reward.  
 In addition, future research should attempt to characterize individual differences 
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that may moderate selective attention to reward stimuli. So far research has demonstrated 
individual differences related to selective attention to irrelevant reward in working 
memory capacity (Anderson et al., 2011), trait impulsivity (Anderson et al., 2011), age 
(Roper, Vecera, & Vaidya, 2014), and depression (Anderson, Leal, Hall, Yassa, & 
Yantis, 2014). In the current study, we found some evidence to suggest that individual 
differences such as working memory capacity and reward sensitivity may impact ability 
to filter irrelevant reward stimuli. Therefore, further research may be able to elucidate 
how reward can be more or less distracting based on individual differences and clinical 
presentations.  
 In summary, although previous research has demonstrated a robust attentional 
bias toward previously rewarded stimuli, little is known about how this attentional bias 
impacts down-stream processing. If attentional selection acts as the gatekeeper of 
attention (Awh et al., 2006) then some decision must be made about how to deal with 
these reward stimuli that are competing for attentional resources. Previous research 
suggests it is not merely ignored or gated from working memory (Gong & Li, 2014), and 
further research may elucidate how these cues influence on going task behavior.  
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